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The American Law Review, in the issue of July and August,
1895, published an article entitled "The Income Tax
Decision, and the Power of the Supreme Court to Nullify
Acts of Congress," written by Sylvester Pennoyer. The tone
of the article is that of a bitter and contemptuous attack upon
the highest tribunal of the nation, and contains a greater
number of absurd and indefensible positions than is common
to articles of this character.
It is evident that Mr. Pennoyer does not think well of the
Supreme Court, and the reason is not far to seek. In the case
of Pennoyer v. '4eff, 95 U. S., p. 714, he was prevented by the
judgment of that tribunal from maintaining possession of the
property of another, acquired under color of a pretended judgment rendered in a State court, in which no service had been
made upon the defendant. Hinc illae lachrymee/
He intimates, most improperly, that the court has surrendered to the grasp of oligarchies, and suggests that if Congress, at its next session, would impeach the judges for
usurpation of legislative power, remove them from office, and
instruct the President to enforce the collection of the income
tax, the Supreme Court of the United States would never
thereafter presume to trench upon the exclusive power of
Congress; and "thus," he says, "the government as created
by our fathers would be restored with all of its faultless and
harmonious proportions."
For the last century, he contends, we have been living
under a government, not based upon the Federal Constitution,
but under one created "by the plausible sophistries of John
Marshall." He asserts that it is a pure assumption on the
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part of the court to declare that the question as to whether a
law is constitutional or not, is a judicial one, and that as the
assumption is faulty, therefore the conclusion is unsound. He
asserts further that the power claimed by the Supreme Court
to nullify a law of Congress is entirely a self-made power.
" In no decision ever rendered by it has it been able to point
out the lettered warrant of the Constitution. It cannot be
done, for it is not there." He sneers at Chancellor Kent for
saying that courts of justice have a right, and are in duty
bound, to bring every law to the test of the Constitution, and
asserts that Kent did not quote his constitutional authority
because he was not able to do so.
He further states that the claim of the Supreme Court to
the right to nullify a law of Congress has no other warrant
than its own assumption. By a garbled and partial reading
of the proceedings in the Federal Convention which framed
the Constitution, he contends that the framers never intended
that -thejurisdiction of the court should extend to cases arising
under the Constitution, but that it was expressly meant to be
limited to "cases of a judiciary nature ;" and that "at that
time no common law court in all Christendom considered its
jurisdiction broadenough to nulfiy the law of the legislature."
The slightest examination into the history of the origin of
Article III. of the Constitution of the United States, which, in
Section 2, expressly declares that "the judicial power shall
extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made or
which shall be made under their authority," will convict the
incautiou-, writer of this article of blunder upon blunder.
The truth is that there were numerous instances of the
exercise of judicial power to set aside acts of the legislature
for lack of conformity to State Constitutions, or the principles
of State Constitutions, which were present to the minds of the
framers of the Constitution, several of whom had, as judges,
participated in the exercise of this very power.
DAVID BRF-RLY, Chief Justice of New Jersey, and a member
of the Federal Convention, had, in the case of Holmes v. Walton
(referred to in State v. Parkhurst, 4 Halstead (N. J.), 444),
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considered most gravely the exercise of such a judicial power.
The case was brought by writ of certiorari before the Supreme
-Court of New Jersey on September 9, 1779, and was argued
on constitutional grounds in November of the same year.
The court held the matter under advisement for three terms,
.and on September 7, 1780, the judges, Brearly, Smith andSymmes, delivered their opinions seriatim for the plaintiff in
.certiorari. (See paper of Dr. Austin Scott, " Papers of the
American Historical Association," Vol. 2, p. 86.) In anticipation of the final decision, the Legislature amended the
statute in question. (Laws of New Jersey, original edition, 49,
4 Halstead, 444.)
In speaking of this decision, Gouverneur Morris wrote to the
Pennsylvania Legislatu-e in 1785: "In New Jersey the
judges pronounced a law unconstitutional and void. Surely,
no good citizen can wish to see the point decided in the
tribunals of Pennsylvania. Such power in judges is dangerous,
but unless it somewhere exists the time employed in framing
a bill of rights and form of government was merely thrown
away." (Sparks' " Life of Gouverneur Morris," Vol. 3, 438.)
The decision of Holmes v. Walton was followed, in 1796, by
the case of Taylor v. Rodney, 4 Halstead, appendix, 440, and
again, in 1804, by State v. Parkhurst,4 Halstead, 427.
In the meantime similar decisions had been reached in other
States. The case of Trevelt v. Weeden was decided in Rhode
Island in 1.786. (Pamphlet of J. B. Varnum, Providence,
-1787.)
Prof Cooley, in his work on "Constitutional Limitations,"
4th ed., 196; Mr. Bryce, in his work on the "American
Commonwealth," Vol. I, p. 532; Prof. Fiske, in his book of
"'The Critical Period of American History," pp. 175, 176;
Prof. McMaster, in his "History of the People of the United
States," Vol. I, 337, and Arnold, in his "History of Rhode
Island," Vol. 2, p. 24, have fallen into the error of asserting
that this was the first case in which the courts held an act of
the legislature unconstitutional and void, on the ground of
conflict with the fundamental law. That this is an error is clear
from the fact that in Virginia, as early as 1782, the courts had
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clearly asserted the power to declare a law void for lack of
conformity to the Constitution.
George Mason, one of the members of the Federal Convention, and no stickler for Federal power, had, as far back as
1772, in the case of Robbins v. Hardaway (Jefferson's Rep.
(Va.) io9), argued against the validity of an act providing for
the descendants of Indian women as slaves, on the ground that
tht act was void as contrary to natural right and justice, and
in violation of rights and duties which men owed to each other
in a state of nature.
In May, 1778, the Legislature of Virginia passed an act of
attainder against one Josiah Phillips, who had been devastating
the State. During the year Phillips was captured, convicted
and executed for highway robbery, the act of attainder being
disregarded. Prof. Tucker (Tucker's Blackstone Appendix,
293) asserts that the court refused to recognize the act of
attainder (see 4 th Burk, Hist. of Va., 305, 3o6), and had
directed the prisoner to be tried.
In 1776, a law had been passed in Virginia, taking from the
executive the power of pardon in cases of treason, and under
this act one Caton, having been convicted of treason, was
pardoned by the House of Delegates without the concurrence
of the Senate. The case reached the courts in 1782 (Commonwealttz v. Caton, 4 Call (Va.), I), when the AttorneyGeneral moved for execution upon the' prisoner. The latter
pleaded the pardon of the House. Under the Constitution, as
it then stood, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals,
and it was there argued that the act of Assembly was contrary
to the plain intent of the Constitution.
Mr. Edmund Randolph, then Attorney-General of Virginia,
subsequently the first Attorney-General of the United States,
and one of the leading members of the Federal Convention,
argued that, whether the act was contrary to the spirit of the
Constitution or not, the court was not authorized to declare it
void. George Wythe, subsequently a framer of the Constitution, and in this very case sitting as a judge, declared: "If
the whole legislature (an event to be deprecated) should
attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by the
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people, I, in administering the public justice of the couritry,
will meet the united efforts at my seat in this tribunal, and,
pointing to the Constitution, will say to them: 'Here is the
limit of your authority, and hither shall you go, but no furChancellor Blair, also a member of the Federal
ther."'
Convention, with the rest of the judges, was of the opinion
that the court had power to declare any resolution of the
legislature, or of either branch of it, to be unconstitutional and
void.
Six years later, in 1788, the question was again raised in thevery interesting "Case of the Judges" (4 Call, Va. 135),
which grew out of an attempt by the legislature to impose.
additional and extra-judicial duties upon the court, and the
judges found themselves obliged to decide "that the Constitution and the acts were in opposition; that they could not
exist together, and that the former must control the operation
of the latter."
These views were again declared in several later cases, and
were directly enforced in 1793, in Keniper v. Hawkins, 2 Va.
Cases, 20. See, also, Turner v. Tzurner, 4 Call, Va. 234;"
Page v. Pendleton, Wythe's Rep. 21 I.
In New York the same question was raised in the celebrated
case of Rutgers v. WVaddinglon, decided in 1784. There
Alexander Hamilton, in a very able argument before the
Mayor's Court of Next York, contended that the Trespass Act,
which authorized actions by owners against those who had
occupied their houses under British orders during the British
occupation, was unconstitutional. Hamilton argued that the
law violated natural justice, and the decision was placed upon
that ground. (Rutgers v. WVaddington, Dawson's Pamphlet,
44; Hamilton's Works, edited by J. C. Hamilton, Vol. 5,
I15, 116; Vol. 7, 197.

In 1792 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held an act
of the Colonial Legislature of 1712 void, as in contravention
of common right and of Magna Charta: Bowman v. Middletoll, I Bay, 252.
In North Carolina the power of the court to refuse to
enforce a law. because unconstitutional, was elaborately

JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION.

8o 1

argued and considered in I787: Bayard v. Singleton, i
Martin (N. C.), 42.
The argument of Mr. Iredell, subsequently a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, is notable, and he expressed his views in plain terms in a correspondence held with
Richard Dobbs Spaight, himself a member of the Federal
Convention, and at the time of the receipt of the letter engaged
in the very act of considering the question of Federal judicial
power. (McRae's " Life and Letters of Iredell," Vol. 2, pp.
172-176. Compare Spaight's views, Iid, pp. 167-169.)
It is beyond the reach of controversy, therefore, that when
the Federal Convention met in 1787 for the purpose of
framing a Constitution for the United States, the idea of controlling the legislature through the judiciary was familiar to
its leading members. It had been asserted in New Jersey,
Virginia, New York, Rhode Island and North Carolina. The
members of the convention who had, either as counsel or as
judges, considered such a question, were among the most
prominent on the floor. There were: From Virginia, George
Wythe, John Blair, Edmund Randolph and George Mason;
from New Jersey, David Brearly; from New York, Alexander
Hamilton; firom North Carolina, Richard Dobbs Spaight,
informed specifically by his correspondence with Iredell, of
counsel in the case of Bayard v. Singleton.
(See a learned paper entitled "The Relation of the Judiciary
to the Constitution," by William M. Meigs, of Philadelphia,
American Law Review for March and April, 1885, pp. 177 to
203. See, also, a paper entitled "The Legislatures and the
Courts : The Power to Declare Statutes Unconstitutional," by
Charles B. Elliott, Ph.D., Political Science Quarterly; Vol. 5,
No. 2. Also, " The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law," Vol. 7, Harvard Law Review,
p. 129.)
As to the views of the members of the Federal Convention,
our space does not permit us to go in detail into the language
of the debates; but no careful student of Madison's Notes, or
of the Journal of the Convention, can fail to reach the conclusion that it was generally admitted by the delegates that
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the courts would have the power under the Constitution;.
without any express gift. Such a power was commented upon
with approval in the convention by Gerry, Morris, James
Wilson, Mason, and Luther Martin. It was opposed by
Mercer, of Maryland, and Dickinson, of Delaware. A few
references must suffice.
On June 4, 1787, Mr. Gerry, of Massachusetts, in speaking
of the judiciary under the new Coustitution, said: "They will
have a sufficient check against encroachments on their own
department by their exposition of the laws, which involves a
power of deciding on their constitutionality. In some of the
States the judges had actually set aside laws, as being against
the Constitution. This was done, too, with general approbation :" 5 Elliott's Debates, 15 I.

The cases to which he referred were undoubtedly the seven
cases in five States, all older than the Constitution of the
United States, which have been presented in the foregoing
review.
On July 17th, Mr. Madison distinctly alluded, with approval,
to the case of Trevett v. TVeeden, saying: "In Rhode Island,
the judges who refused to execute an unconstitutional law
were displaced, and others substituted by the legislature, who
would be the willing instruments of their masters:" 5 Elliott,
p. 321.

On the same day, Mr. Gouverneur Morris, said: " A law
that ought to be negatived will be set aside in the Judiciary
Department, and if that security should fail, may be repealed
by a national law."
Roger Sherman said: "Such a power involves a wrong
principle, to wit: that a law of a State contrary to the articles
of Union would, if not negatived, be valid and operative: " 5
Elliott, 321, 322.
The convention then rejected a legislative negative, and
made a long leap forward, and adopted the language of the
Constitution as it now stands in Article III., and adopted also
the second paragraph of Article VI., which reads as follows :
"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or
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which shall be made under the authority of the United States,.
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or.
laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
On the 23 d of August, an ineffectual effort was made by Mr..
Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, in favor of a legislative
negative. Mr. Williamson, of North Carolina, thought it was
unnecessary, "and having already been decided, a revival was
a waste of time."
In a work entitled "An Essay on Judicial Power and
Unconstitutional Legislation, Being a Commentary on Parts
of the Constitution of the United States," Mr. Brinton Coxe, a
most accomplished member of the Philadelphia Bar, a Democrat of the strictest standing, and a strict constructionist,
contends most ingeniously that the framers of the Constitution
actually intended by express enactment that the Supreme
Court of the United States should be competent in all litigations before it to decide upon the question of the constitutionality of State laws and State Constitutions, and to hold the
same to be void in so far as contrary to the Constitution and
constitutional laws and treaties of the United States.
While we are not inclined to agree with Mr. Coxe that the
judicial power to pass upon the question of the constitutionality of statutes is an ezpress power, but prefer to adhere to
the views of Marshall that it is clearly implied, yet it is most.
interesting to observe that so profound and scholarly a Student
of the Constitution, as was Mr. Coxe, so far from expressing
himself in wild and revolutionary sentiments, suggestive of
violence, and displaying the most startling ignorance of facts
well known to all well-informed lawyers, attributed to the
framers a larger measure, of intention than was ever contended
for by the most devout admirers of Marshall.
In the State Convention, the matter was discussed in Connecticut by Oliver Ellsworth, who called the judiciary "a
constitutional check ;" in North Carolina by Davies, in
Pennsylvania by Wilson, and in Virginia by John Marshall,
Edmund Randolph and Patrick Henry. The last named was
a decided opponent of the Constitution, but he was-an earnest

804 JUDICIAL POWER AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL LEGISLATION.

advocate of the independence of the judiciary. He believed
that the judges should decide upon the constitutionality of a
law, and feared that the National Judiciary, as organized,
would not possess sufficient independence for this purpose.
He used the following language: "The honorable gentleman
did our judiciary honor in saying that they had firmness
enough to counteract the legislature in some cases. Yes, sir,
our judges opposed the acts of the legislature. We have this
landmark to guide us. They had fortitude to declare that
they were the judiciary, and would oppose unconstitutional
acts. Are you sure that your Federal Judiciary will act thus?
Is that judiciary so well constituted, and so independent of the
other branches, as our State Judiciary?
Where are your
landmarks in this government? I will be bold to say you
cannot find any:" 2 Elliott's Debates, 248.
In the Federalist,No. 78 and No. 8o, the independence of
the judiciary is elaborately discussed, and the existence of the
power to pass upon questions of constitutionality is taken
for granted. It is there commented upon, not as a mere
possibility, but in order to remove any lingering objections
there might be to such a practice. (See I 9 th Am. Law
Review, p. 184.)
The Judiciary Act of 24th September, 1789, which was the
work, almost exclusively, of Oliver Ellsworth, himself a
.member of the Federal Convention, and familiar with the
views 8f his colleagues, provided for the review in the Supreme
Court of the United States of judgments in the circuit courts
and district courts upon writs of error, as well as upon a
certificate of division of opinions, whether the causes originated
in the circuit courts, or were removed there from the State
courts, as well as for the review of cases where the validity of
State statutes or any exercise of State authority should be
drawn in question on the ground of repugnancy to the
Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the
decision should be in favor of their validity. This statute,
which it is no exaggeration to term a veritable bond of union,
is a clear legislative expression of the views of the First
Congress under the Constitution-that the questions referred
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to are judicial questions, and that the determination, of
them belongs, under the Constitution, to the Supreme
Court.
The first case, in -which the power of the Federal Courts to
decline to enforce an act of Congress was asserted, illustrates
the prevailing idea as to the position of the judiciary as well
as the extreme modesty of the judges. The case is Hayburn's,
2 Dallas, 409.
Congress had passed an act in March, 1792,
providing for the settlement of claims of widows and orphans
barred by certain limitations, and regulating claims for invalid
pensions. The act directed the United States Circuit Courts
to pass upon such claims, and made their decisions subject to
review by the Secretary of War and by Congress. In the
Circuit Court for the District of New York, Chief Justice JAY,
,Justice CuSHING; and District Judge DUANE, filed an order
declining to execute the act as Judges, but declaring that "as
the objects of this act are exceedingly benevolent, and do
honor to the humanity and justice of Congress, and as the
judges desire to manifest on all proper occasions, and in every
proper manner, their highest respect for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of Commissioners." Justices WILSON and BLAIR, and District Judge
PETERS, of the Circuit Court for Pennsylvania, absolutely
.refused to execute the act.
Justice IREDELL, and District Judge SITGREAVES, of the North
Carolina Circuit, before any case came before them, joined in
a letter to the President, expressing their doubt as to their
power under the law to act even as commissioners.
The question reached the Supreme Court. at the August
Term, 1792, on an application for a mandamus to the District
Court for the District of Pennsylvania. Attorney General
Randolph entered into an elaborate discussion and analysis of
the powers and duties of the court, and advised the execution
of the law. Of his argument, he said: "The sum of my
.argument was an admission of the power [of the court] to
refuse to execute, but the unfitness of this occasion." (See
Conway's "Life of Edmund Randolph," 144-45.) No doubt
,existed in the minds of the judges, yet so great was the desire
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to avoid a conflict that the motion was taken under advisement, and held until the statute was' amended.
A subsequent case, however, was brought by amicable
action against one Yale Todd to recover money paid him
under a finding of Chief Justice JAY, and Judges CUSHING and
LAW, acting as commissioners. After argument, judgment
was rendered against the defendant, No opinion, stating the
grounds of the decision, was filed, but the result was a determination that, as the power conferred by the act of 1792 was
not judicial within the meaning of the Constitution, the act
was unconstitutional. Chief Justice JAY and Justices CUSHING,
WILSON, BLAIR and PATERSON were present at the decision,
which seems to have been unanimous. (See note to United
States v. Ferreira,13 Howard, 4o and 52.)
The question was again raised, in 1798, in the case of Calder
v. BU11, 3 Dallas, 386, and some doubts were expressed by
Mr. Justice CHASE as to the jurisdiction of the court to determine that any law of a State Legislature contrary to the Constitution of the State was void, but he declined to express an
opinion whether the Supreme Court could declare void an act
of Congress contrary to the Federal Constitution.
A similar question was raised in the case of Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dallas, 194, where MR. Justice CHASE said: " It is,
a general opinion, indeed it is expressly admitted by all this
bar, and some of the judges have, individually, in the circuits,
decided that the Supreme Court can declare an act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and, therefore, invalid; but there
is no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon the point.
I agree, however, in the general sentiment."
The learned judge had evidently forgotten the decision in
the case of United States v. Yale Todd. The question was
directly raised before Chief Justice MARSHALL in the famous
case of iarbin:' v. Madison, decided in 1803, in which, as
Chancellor KENT declares (I Kent's Commentaries, 453),
"the power and duty of the judiciary to disregard an unconstitutional act of Congress, or of any State Legislature, were
declared in an argument approaching to the precision and
certainty of a mathematical demonstration."
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The language of Chief Justice MARSHALL is clear and conclusive. "The Constitution is either a superior, paramount
law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and, like any other act, is alterable
when the legislature shall please to alter it. If the former part
of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the
Constitution is not law. If the latter part be true, then written
constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to
limit a power in its own nature illimitable. . . If an act of a
legislature, repugnant to the Constitution, is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the courts and oblige them
to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law,
does it constitute a rule as operative as though it was a law?
This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in
theory; and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross
to be insisted upon. It shall, however, receive more attentive
consideration. It is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and
interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
courts must decide on the operation of each. This is the very
essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard
the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any
ordinary acts of the legislature, the Constitution, and not such
ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then,who controvert the principle that the Constitution
is to be considered in court as a paramouut law, are reduced
to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their
eyes on the Constitution and see only the law."
To characterize such reasoning as sophistry is childish. A
school-boy might as well challenge a proposition of Euclid, or
attempt to ridicule the Pincipiaof Newton. Thomas Jefferson stormed at it in impotent rage, and since his time a few
atrabilious critics have denounced it as mere obiter dictum ;but, notwithstanding all assaults, it stands as an adamantine
piece of reasoning, and constitutes an invincible buttress of
our nationality. '
The power was never again seriously questioned in the
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Federal courts for many years, until the question directly arose
in Cozens v. VFirginia, 6 Wheaton, 264. The reasoning of
MARSHALL in that case has settled it forever. Nothing but a
political earthquake can unsettle it. The pyramid of Cheops
has stood for six thousand years unshaken by the barkings of
the jackals at its base. The power has been constantly exercised, and the instances in which statutes of the United States
have been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
of the United States, stated in order of time, are as follows:
1792, Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas, 409;
S794, U. S. v. Yale Todd, 13 Howard, 52;
ft803, Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, 137;
:185 1, U. S. v. Ferreira,13 Howard, 4o;
1864, Gordon v. U. S., 2 Wallace, 561 ;
i866, Ex parte Garland,4 Wallace, 333;
1869, Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wallace, 603;
:869, U. S. v. DeWitt, 9 Wallace, 4 ;
:1869, The Justices v. Alutray, 9 Wallace, 274;
1870, Collector v. Day, I I Wallace, 113;
187i, United States v. Klein, 13 Wallace, 128 ;
1872, U. S. v. R. R. Co., 17 Wallace, 322;
1875, U. S. v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214;
1877, U. S. v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670;
1879, Trademark Cases, Ioo U. S. 82;
1879, Colburn v. Tompson, 10 3 U. S. 168;
1882, U. S. v. Harris, io6 U. S. 629;
1883, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3;
z885, Boydv. U. S., II6 U. S. 616;
1887, Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 54o, and in
1895, Income Tax Cases, not yet reported.
Thus, from 1790 to 1895, inclusive, the Supreme Court has
,exercised the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitutional, because of conflict with the Constitution, in twenty-one
.separate instances. During the same period it exercised the
,same power without challenge or remark, as to jurisdiction, in
relation to the statutes of the States and Territories in one
hundred and eighty-two instances: Seven cases being from
Alabama, four from Arkansas, seven from California, one from
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Delaware, one from the District of Columbia, one from
Florida, eight from Georgia, six from Illinois, three from
Indiana, four from Iowa, three from Kansas, four from Kentucky, nineteen from Louisiana, one from Maine, nine from
Maryland, two from Massachusetts, two from Michigan, three
from Minnesota, one from Mississippi, eleven from Missouri,
one from Montana, one from Nevada, one from New Hampshire, one from New Jersey, sixteen from New York, two
from North Carolina, nine from Ohio, two from Oregon,
thirteen from Pennsylvania, four from North Carolina, eight
from Tennessee, five from Texas, one from Utah, one from
Vermont, thirteen from Virginia, three from West Virginia,
and three from Wisconsin.
A partial list of these cases (complete, however, up to 1888),
is to be found in the Centennial Appendix to Volume 131 of
the United States Reports.
See, also, Appendix No. 2 to the Annual Address of J. H.
Benton, Jr., of Boston, Mass., printed in the proceedings of
the Southern New Hampshire Bar Association, 1894.
After these numerous and repeated exercises of power, alI
of which, even the earliest, rest upon the soundest and broadest foundations, it is preposterous to speak of the decision of
the Supreme Court in the Income Tax cases as an " assumption of authority."
Whether the act itself was in terms just or unjust, wise or
foolish, does not touch the question. If Congress does not
possess the power to pass such an act under the Constitution,
there is no law of which the feature. can be discussed.
To attempt to reverse the decision of the court on the
ground of the supposed justice of the act reviewed, or to vindicate the act upon the false and untenable assertion that. the
court has usurped authority, is to argue in a vicious circle. It
indicates an entire lack of comprehension as to the distinction
existing between legislative and judicial power.
He who railed against the government, and preached sedi
tion was, in former days, after conviction, either hanged or sent
to Botany Bay. ,As this is an age of milder manners, it may
be sufficient to suggest to all those who are disappointed in

